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THE WORK-FAMILY BALANCE IN COLLECTIVE AGREEMENTS 
MORE FEMALE EMPLOYEES, MORE PROVISIONS?  ABSTRACT 
No one will question that the share of women working in the Dutch labour market increased over the 
last decades. It is also apparent that there is a rapid development of childcare and other work-family 
balance provisions in collective labour agreements (CLAs): either these provisions are being included in 
collective agreements, or existing provisions are being expanded. The reasons for this are obvious: from 
the employee’s point of view, childcare provisions make it interesting for women to join or stay in the 
labour market; from the employer’s point of view, although it may be a costly issue, these provisions 
may help attract and retain female employees. 
The main question is the following: to what extent can the share of female employees covered by a CLA 
explain the presence of work-family provisions in CLAs? Furthermore, does the gender of the union 
negotiator have a significant additional affect? 
The DUCADAM dataset, a digital database on collective labour agreements in the Netherlands, is used 
to tackle these questions. The findings show that the hypothesised relationships do not exist. Appar-
ently, the supply of work-family provisions in CLAs is not a response to female employees’ demands, 
nor is it affected by the negotiator’s gender. Rather, economical factors seem to underlie work-family 
developments in CLAs, as indicated by the positive correlation between work-family provisions and 
yearly wage increase levels. 
 
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
Het lijdt geen twijfel dat het percentage vrouwen op de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt de afgelopen jaren is 
toegenomen. Het is ook bekend dat steeds meer kinderopvang– en andere werk-zorgregelingen in col-
lectieve arbeidsovereenkomsten (CAO’s) worden opgenomen. De redenen hiervoor liggen voor de 
hand. Uit het oogpunt van de werknemer bezien maken kinderopvangregelingen het interessant voor de 
vrouwelijke werknemer om te gaan of blijven werken; uit het oogpunt van de werkgever bezien kunnen 
deze regelingen, hoewel kostbaar, helpen om vrouwelijke werknemers aan te trekken en te behouden. 
De kernvraag is: in hoeverre kan de aanwezigheid van werk-zorgregelingen in CAO’s verklaard worden 
door het aandeel vrouwen dat onder de CAO valt? Is verder het geslacht van de CAO-onderhandelaar 
van  significant belang? 
Deze vragen worden beantwoord met behulp van de DUCADAM dataset, een digitale CAO-databank 
waarin Nederlandse CAO’s zijn opgeslagen. De resultaten van het onderzoek laten zien dat de 
veronderstelde verbanden niet bestaan. Blijkbaar zijn de werk-zorgontwikkelingen in CAO’s niet het 
antwoord op de vraag daarnaar door vrouwelijke werknemers, noch op het geslacht van de CAO-
onderhandelaar. De verklaring lijkt gezocht te moeten worden in economische motieven, gezien de 
positieve samenhang tussen werk-zorgregelingen in de CAO en jaarlijkse structurele loonsverhoging. CONTENTS 
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1   I NTRODUCTION 
Most countries in the European Union witnessed rising female employment rates over the last 
decades, as well as an increasing awareness of the importance of a favourable work-family balance. In 
the Netherlands, the situation is no different. In this paper, the relationship between the two issues 
is analysed. It starts with a description of the current state of affairs in the Netherlands, and is 
followed by hypothesis formulation, a description of the data and the methodology, and results and 
conclusions. 
1.1   DUTCH LABOUR MARKET TRANSITIONS AND THE WORK-FAMILY BALANCE 
Over a decade ago, the scientific council for government policy in the Netherlands (the WRR) set 
three main targets with respect to the Dutch labour market (WRR 1991; De Beer 2002). First, to 
counter the effects of an aging population and stimulate economic growth; second, to stimulate 
emancipation and equality processes, and third, to promote individual well-being and happiness. In 
practice, this should be achieved by increasing the labour force, giving women more opportunities to 
enter the labour market, and helping women and men find a good work-family balance, respectively. 
Today, work-family balance is an important issue in many countries in the European Union 
(Department for Education and Employment 1998; Bruegel 1999; Schulten 2000; Yeandle e.a. 2000; 
EIRO 2001; OECD 2001; EuroFound 2004). With employment rates of both men and women rising 
steadily, the need for effective arrangements that facilitate the combination of work and care is 
growing. While ‘care’ can signify both care for children, care for other family members living in the 
same house, and care for family living elsewhere, the usual interpretation is the first. Therefore, in 
this paper care will be defined as childcare. Ermisch (2003) asserts that in richer countries, marriage 
and childbearing now occur much later in people’s lives, and they are having fewer children. Couples 
may decide to postpone having children, in favour of being employed (OECD 2001). Consequently, 
many new government policies and laws are dealing with this issue. Examining transitions on the 
Dutch labour market, the situation is no different. The employment rate has risen considerably, 
which is mostly due to the participation of women. Between 1993 and 2003, the employment rate 
increased from 57 per cent to 65 per cent (CBS 2004); for women it grew from 42 per cent to 54 
per cent 1 . Considering that women may be mothers of young children, the demand for 
arrangements that help workers find a beneficial work-family balance became stronger. This concern 
was recognised by the Ministry of Social Affairs, who launched a plan of action in July 2001, intending 
to stimulate labour market participation of women (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2001). 
The plan included lowering the income threshold for mothers claiming childcare taxes deduction. 
                                                  
1   Employment rate is defined as the number of working people aged 15 to 64, divided by the total population aged 15 to 
64. 
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Work-family arrangements can be both informal and formal. Informal arrangements include child-
minding by grandparents and other family members, neighbours, or unpaid babysitters. They are the 
primary choice of lower-educated (and therefore mostly low-income) families (Esveldt 2002), possi-
bly because informal childcare arrangements are relatively cheap. In 2000, 84 per cent of Dutch 
women who had children aged between 0 and 4 made use of informal childcare arrangements 
(Leijnse 2001). 
nd Vinken 2000). 
Formal arrangements are found in Dutch law, for instance the Part-time Labour Act (Wet 
Aanpassing Arbeidsduur (WAA), established in July 2000), and the Work and Care Act (Wet arbeid 
& zorg (Wa&z), December 2001). The WAA states that every employee has the right to ask his or 
her employer to work fewer or more hours per week. The employer must comply with this 
request, providing the company’s interests are not harmed. The Wa&z envelops several regulations 
that deal with childcare. According to this legislation, women are allowed at least 16 weeks of fully 
paid pregnancy and maternity leave, of which 10 weeks must occur after giving birth. The father can 
also take leave to be present at childbirth and on two days afterwards. In addition to this, both 
parents are entitled to unpaid parental leave, for the duration of 13 times their weekly working 
hours. Someone working 36 hours a week, for example, is entitled to 468 hours of unpaid leave, 
which amounts to 13 weeks. In the regulation, it as advised that the parent works 50 per cent of 
their usual working hours, spread out over half a year (Ministry of Social Affairs en Employment 
2004). In the example, the employee would then be working 18 hours a week for 26 weeks. Formal 
work-family arrangements are appreciated widely in the Netherlands; Dutch couples expect it to be 
easier to combine work and family in the future, given the increasing opportunities for childcare, 
working at home, flex-work, part-time work and care leave (Ester a
One of the most important institutions that cover formal childcare arrangements in the Netherlands 
is the collective labour agreement (CLA). CLAs are collective agreements on conditions of employ-
ment between employees, who are represented by trade unions, and employers, who are some-
times represented by employers’ organisations. The importance lies in the fact that, for instance, 
CLAs are not always bound by law – in many articles of law, stipulations are recorded that a CLA 
may deviate, partly or entirely, from that specific article. All articles of law that deal with the work-
family balance have these kinds of additional declarations. There are two types of CLAs: company 
CLAs, which pertain to one company, and sectoral CLAs, which pertain to an entire branch of in-
dustry. 14 per cent of all Dutch employees are covered by a company CLA, and sectoral CLAs 
cover 70 per cent of Dutch employees. Regular agreements concern conditions and benefits like 
wages, work schedules, rights and obligations, working conditions, social security, and work-family 
themes. Non-regular agreements cover only one subject of regular CLAs, like social funds, training, 
and older workers, known in Dutch as SF, O&O, and VUT, respectively. These types of agreements 
usually exist alongside a regular CLA of the company or sector, and they are used when a specific 
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target population must be addressed. This target population is generally smaller than the number of 
employees covered by the regular CLA, which may have consequences for the agreement becoming 
generally binding2. 
Although the sectoral level of collective bargaining remains dominant in the Netherlands, a trend 
towards decentralisation can be observed over the years until about the year 2000, as ever more 
(decentralised) company-level labour agreements were being negotiated. One of the consequences 
has been a rising demand for people who can represent employees in collective bargaining. In 
accordance with increasing female employment rates, the number of female trade union negotiators 
grew also. For instance, in 1996, 39 female negotiators were employed by FNV trade unions in the 
Netherlands, while in 2000 there were 60. From then on, however, this number began decreasing 
again. Now, approximately 50 women (and 100 men3) are responsible for collective bargaining by 
union negotiator? In the next section, ideas and theories that relate to this 
question are described. 
                                                
FNV. 
In this paper, the following question will be addressed: can the presence of work-family provisions in 
CLAs be explained by the share of female employees covered by the CLA and by the gender of the 
CLA’s main trade 
1.2   THEORIES AND IDEAS ABOUT THE WORK-FAMILY BALANCE 
The rising female employment rate is not unique to the Netherlands. In all countries belonging to 
the European Union – except Sweden, where the rate was already very high – the employment rate 
of women increased over the past decade, ranging from 2 percentage points in Denmark to over 18 
percentage points in Ireland (Eurostat 2003). It is informative to see whether balancing work and 
family life is an important issue in these other countries. What measures have the government, em-
ployers, trade unions or individual people taken to arrange the care of children when parents are at 
work? Most countries in the European Union have parental leave arrangements that allow one or 
both parents time off to care for their children, either paid or unpaid. Employees in Denmark can 
count on 13 to 26 weeks of paid parental leave. The level of pay is at most 70 per cent of unem-
ployment benefits. The employer can get this payment refunded by the government. Compared with 
most other European countries, childcare provision has been widely available in Finland for some 
decades. For every child, a place in a day-care centre is reserved until they are seven years old. Re-
cent legislation allows firms to arrange childcare services for those employees who would otherwise 
stay at home to look after a sick child (www.eurofound.eu.int 2004). Mothers are also allowed up to 
 
2   A CLA that is declared generally binding is valid and binding for all employers in the same branch of industry. Employers 
can ask for this declaration at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment if they want to limit unfair competition by 
other employers in the same branch with respect to terms and conditions. The request is granted if the CLA covers at 
least 55 per cent of all employees in the branch, or if it covers at least 52 per cent and is considered important because 
of, for instance, its representative character. 
3   The development of men working as a negotiator at FNV has followed almost exactly the same pattern as that of female 
negotiators. 
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three years of unpaid leave after childbirth, after which their old job will still be available to them. In 
Luxembourg, female employees can choose to prolong their maternity leave, after which the em-
ployer is obligated to rehire the woman if a job is available. The situation in France is almost identi-
cal to that in Luxembourg, except that men can make use of this option too. Portuguese law grants 
employees the right to interrupt their work for the duration of 6 months, during which they receive 
no benefits, to care for children of their own, of their spouse’s or an adopted child. This period is 
extendable to 2 years. However, this option is only available for either the father or the mother 
ncome, below which parents are entitled to a 
 places more emphasis on out-of-school provision 
(www.eurofound.eu.int 2004). 
In July 2000, the German parliament (Bundestag) adopted a revision of the Federal Childcare 
Payment and Parental Leave Act (Bundeserziehungsgeldgesetz), which contains new provisions on 
parental leave and childcare payments (EIRO 2001). The new act came into force on 1 January 2001. 
The most important changes made to parental leave are that both parents are allowed to take 
parental leave at the same time, and the permitted maximum level of part-time work during parental 
leave is extended from 19 to 30 hours per week. Furthermore, parents have the right to work part-
time for between 15 and 30 hours per week. Employers are permitted to reject such requests only 
if this creates considerable problems for the company. After the period of parental leave, the 
employees concerned have the right to return to full-time work. In addition, parents have the 
opportunity to postpone the third year of parental leave until the eighth birthday of the child 
(Schulten 2000). Finally, the upper limits of net annual i
full childcare benefit payment, increased by about 10 per cent. 
The situation is somewhat different in the UK. Until recently, public provision of childcare has been 
very limited, because the British government regarded care of children as the private responsibility 
of parents throughout most of the 1980s and 1990s. As a result, informal childcare arrangements 
have dominated, with grandparental and paternal care cited as the most commonly used sources of 
childcare by employed mothers of pre-school children (Gardiner cited in Bruegel 1999). Because 
professional childcare is expensive, mainly dual or high-wage earners make use of it. This type of 
childcare may be provided in a variety of settings: in the child's own home, by nannies or au pairs; in 
the childcare worker's home, for example by registered childminders; or in day nurseries, out-of-
school facilities and activity clubs led by nurses, play leaders, play workers and childcare assistants 
(Yeandle e.a. 2000). Only in the late 1990s has there been a large increase in the number of day 
nurseries in England, and this upward trend seems likely to continue. The most important reason for 
this increase is the introduction of the National Childcare Strategy in 1998, which is expected to 
create 90.000 new childcare jobs. Furthermore, it offers help with childcare costs for an estimated 
1.5 million lower earning families, and it
(Department for Education and Employment 1998). 
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The OECD has recently investigated policies and practices related to balancing work and family life 
and relevant flexible work arrangements for the United States, Canada, Japan and all EU countries 
except Luxembourg (OECD 2001). These countries are rated according to the extent to which 
work-family provisions are available to working parents. This score is a composition of the coverage 
of the under-three-year-olds in formal childcare, maternity leave, flexi-time, voluntary part-time and 
the extra-statutory leave by firms. The scores are standardised with an average of zero; a positive 
score means that work-family provisions are better than average. It turns out that there is a strong 
(Schaeps 2003). In 1990, this was only 21 per cent. After considering CLA 
tionship between female employment and 
correlation between this work-family provision score and the female employment rate (r=0.81); 
much stronger than the correlation with the male employment rate (r=0.52). 
In their 2003 report of the ongoing research project on childcare arrangements in CLAs, the Dutch 
Labour Inspectorate found that, in a representative sample of 125 Dutch CLAs, 89 per cent includes 
a childcare provision 
coverage, they concluded that 68 per cent of the Dutch working population could now make use of 
such an arrangement. 
It is clear that female labour market participation rates steadily increased in all EU countries during 
the last decade, and work-family issues like childcare received more and more government and 
media attention. It seems likely that the growing share of women in the labour force created an 
increasing demand for work-family arrangements, which are being supplied through the institution of 
the collective labour agreement. Female trade union negotiators possibly helped speed up this 
process. The empirical evidence for this, as described in the preceding paragraphs, is measured at 
country level. In order to understand the assumed rela
trade union negotiators on the one hand, and work-family provisions in CLAs on the other, the level 
of analysis in this paper is the collective labour agreement.  
In principle, collective agreements can contain nine types of work-family provisions: (1) opportuni-
ties for part-time work; (2) childcare facilities or provisions; (3) paternity leave arrangements; (4) 
parental leave arrangements; (5) maternity leave arrangements; (6) opportunities for employees to 
work flexible hours; (7) teleworking or working at home arrangements; (8) career break opportuni-
ties; and (9) financial compensation for services like cleaning, gardening, ironing and grocery service. 
Of these, only the first five are covered formally in Dutch collective labour agreements. How do 
these provisions take shape in collective labour agreements, and how can they facilitate the combi-
nation of work and care? CLA regulations on part-time work are primarily centred on the question 
whether or not it is allowed. If so, the most important specifications that may be added are whether 
all employees can make use of it, whether a minimum number of working hours is required, and 
whether part-timers have the same rights as full-time employees. Working part-time enables parents 
to spend more time at home to care for their children. If, for example, an employee is scheduled to 
work five days a week from 10 AM until 4 PM, she can use the extra free time to bring children to 
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and from school. If children are not yet school age, a part-time construction where the employee 
works eight-hour days, but only three or four days a week, might be preferred. Parents can effec-
tively save on expenses for kindergartens and babysitters, especially if the employee’s partner has a 
similar arrangement. Childcare regulations typically include monetary contributions to employees 
with childcare needs. These regulations may vary from CLA to CLA with respect to the amount of 
financial compensation, the target population that is entitled to it, the maximum age of children for 
whom employees may use the compensation, and whether a special fund has been established in 
which money is reserved for the purpose of childcare compensation. Paternity, parental and mater-
nity leave arrangements in CLAs are mostly concerned with the amount of time off that employees 
ion are more beneficial to women than to men. Secondly, labour market data 




1e)  ikelihood of pregnancy and maternity leave regulations being included in a CLA is larger 
                                                
are entitled to, and whether they receive full pay during this time. Again, these leave arrangements 
allow parents to stay at home to carry out their childcare duties. 
The first five hypotheses pertain to the relationship between female employment and work-family 
provisions in CLAs. More specifically, a positive relationship between the share of women who fall 
under CLA X and the presence of each of the five work-family items in CLA X is expected. One 
could argue that it would be more sensible to study parents4 instead of only women, since fathers 
also profit from work-family provisions in their collective labour agreement. However, there are 
two reasons to choose women instead of parents as the focus of this research. First, in 95 per cent 
of the households in which both partners have a job, the burden of combining work with childcare is 
carried by the woman (Tijdens, Dragstra and Dragstra e.a. 2002), so provisions in CLAs that 
facilitate this combinat
on parents, particularly related to being cove
for t research project. 
eses 1a to 1e are formulated below. 
1a)  The likelihood of part-time regulations being included in a CLA is larger when the share of 
women within the group of employees that is covered by the CLA is larger. 
1b)  The likelihood of childcare regulations being included in a CLA is larger when the share of 
women within the group of employees that is covered by the CLA is larger. 
1c)  The likelihood of paternity leave regulations being included in a CLA is larger when the 
share of women within the group of employees that is covered by the CLA is la
1d)  The likelihood of parental leave regulations being included in a CLA is larger when the share 
of women within the group of employees that is covered by the CLA is larger. 
The l
when the share of women within the group of employees that is covered by the CLA is 
larger. 
 
4   Especially young parents, for example aged 20 to 35, for whom childcare may be an issue. 
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These hypotheses will be tested against the null-hypothesis that there is no relationship between the 
share of women and the presence of a work-family provision. 
Collective labour agreements are the result of collective bargaining between employers and trade 
union negotiators. A negotiator can be either male or female, which may influence their position 
towards work-family provisions as secondary benefits. These provisions are primarily beneficial to 
female employees, since women still carry most of the childcare burden. Being of the same gender, 
female negotiators understand this better than their male colleagues, and will therefore put more 
energy into bargaining for arrangements that will lighten the burden. This leads to the second set of 
five hypotheses, in which each of the five work-family items is hypothetically related to the gender of 
to being a male one, increases the likelihood for a work-family item to be included in the CLA. 
nefit item. Thus, 
the main trade union negotiator – more specifically, in which being a female negotiator, as opposed 
2a)  The likelihood of part-time regulations being included in a CLA is larger if the main trade 
union negotiator is a woman. 
2b)  The likelihood of childcare regulations being included in a CLA is larger if the main trade 
union negotiator is a woman. 
2c)  The likelihood of paternity leave regulations being included in a CLA is larger if the main 
trade union negotiator is a woman. 
2d)  The likelihood of parental leave regulations being included in a CLA is larger if the main 
trade union negotiator is a woman. 
2e)  The likelihood of pregnancy and maternity leave regulations being included in a CLA is larger 
if the main trade union negotiator is a woman. 
These hypotheses will be tested against the null-hypothesis that there is no relationship between the 
gender of the negotiator and the presence of each of the work-family provisions. 
From an employer’s point of view, paying for childcare and other work-family provisions can indeed 
be a useful instrument to attract and retain female employees, providing that the costs associated 
with it are reasonable. Initial investments in childcare provisions may be costly only if an employer 
finances childcare facilities within the company, so in practice, most companies outsource childcare 
to external day-care centres. If the share of women in the company or sector is low, then costs per 
FTE are limited, since a small number of women will make use of these arrangements. When the 
share of women in the company or sector is high, however, chances are that many women will 
make use of childcare provisions and employers may face an expensive employee be
if relatively many women are employed within a company or a labour market branch, it is more 
costly for employers to provide female employees with work-family arrangements. 
On the assumption that the five work-family provisions are interchangeable, an aggregate work-
family provision variable can be constructed by combining these five provisions statistically to create 
a compound variable, measuring the level – or, to be more precise, the number – of work-family 
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provisions in a collective labour agreement. One of the advantages of such a compound variable is 
the increased variability: six possible values instead of only two. Providing that the construction of 
this variable is acceptable, the model will gain more accurate predicting power. Replacing the five 
ses. 
loyees that is covered by the CLA is larger. 
s nor the 
gender of the trade union negotiator has an effect on the number of work-family provisions in the 
d in the model in figure 1. 
g ent variables. 
dependent variables in hypotheses 1 and 2 with the aggregate variable yields the following hypothe-
3)  The number of work-family provisions included in a CLA is higher if the share of women 
within the group of emp
4)  The number of work-family provisions included in a CLA is higher if the main trade union 
negotiator is a woman. 
These will be tested against the null-hypotheses that neither the share of female employee
CLA. All hypotheses can be summarised graphically, as illustrate
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The independent variables, in the left part of the model, are hypothetically related to each distinct 
work-family provision (1) and to all provisions as a whole (2). 
The basic relationship structure, as depicted above, will probably be more complex than this. A 
more realistic picture will include intervening and control variables. Consider wage increase, for in-
stance. Collective agreements in which a generous wage increase has been agreed upon may leave 
the employer with fewer economic resources for the inclusion of work-family balance provisions 
than CLAs in which the wage increase is small or even non-existent. Thus, the level of wage increase 
may influence the relationship between the share of female employees and / or the gender of the 
negotiator on the one hand, and the presence or extent of work-family balance provisions on the 
other hand. If one assumes that larger companies tend to have larger budgets for things like child-
8   AIAS – UvA    Work-family balance in collective agreements 
care and leave arrangements, then CLA size is another complicating factor in the proposed research 
model. Continuing on this thought, it would then make sense that sectoral CLAs have more work-
family provisions than company CLAs, since they cover more employees. So, CLA type appears to 
play a part in the conceptual framework too. Finally, the public sector / private sector divide may be 
of importance, although exact implications cannot be estimated beforehand. The control variables 
that are mentioned here will be discussed in more detail in the next section on methods and meas-
urements.  
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2   M ETHODS AND MEASUREMENTS 
In this section, the dataset is described first, after which the operationalisation of variables and test-
ing methods are explained. 
2.1   CLAS IN THE NETHERLANDS 
In the Netherlands, 80 per cent of all employees are covered by a collective labour agreement 
(Vossen and Engelen 2002). The exact number of CLAs depends on how they are defined. The Min-
istry of Social Affairs and Employment regards only those CLAs that have been registered at the 
ministry as valid5, which include both regular and non-regular agreements. In December 2003, the 
total number of current CLAs according to the ministry was 1005. The largest Dutch trade union 
confederation, the FNV, only considers regular collective labour agreements to be ‘real’ CLAs, of 
which more than 15 per cent are not registered at the ministry. The FNV is currently bargaining 
over 769 different CLAs, of which they keep a detailed account in a CLA database. The database 
contains about 92 per cent of all existing Dutch CLAs, which implies that there are now 836 collec-
tive labour agreements in force in the Netherlands. In the next paragraph, the backgrounds of the 
FNV’s database are described, along with a general idea of the database itself. 
Currently, 14 trade unions are affiliated with the FNV, FNV Bondgenoten being the largest with 
over 480.000 members. This trade union began setting up a database of all collective agreements 
signed by FNV-affiliated trade unions in the mid-90s (Tijdens 2002). The ‘FNV cao-databank’, as it is 
called, is a digital database which stores all collective labour agreements negotiated by FNV trade 
unions in the Netherlands since 1995. These CLAs are stored in the form of texts and 650 different 
coded characteristics, plus proposal letters, pamphlets, change notes and jurisprudence texts. In 
2003, the Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS) has made both a scientific trans-
lation and an extension of the FNV database, culminating in the DUCADAM dataset6. This dataset is 
an SPSS file in which collective labour agreements are cases and CLA characteristics are variables. 
The extension consists of newly created meta-variables, which are not actually included in CLAs but 
are closely tied to them, for instance branch of industry, gender of the negotiator, and type of CLA 
(Schreuder and Tijdens 2003). This kind of collective labour agreement database is rather unique; a 
comparable database of the same scope and depth is constructed and updated by research and train-
ing organisation ACIRRT, of the University of Sydney, Australia, but nowhere else. 
                                                  
5   In order for a CLA to be lawfully valid, registration of the CLA by one or all of the negotiating parties at the Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Employment is required. 
6   DUCADAM is an acronym for Dutch Collective Agreements Database And Monitor. 
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In January 2004, the DUCADAM dataset contained 3752 CLAs, with 1001 different CLA-numbers7. 
Of these 1001, 769 CLAs are currently in force, while the other 232 ceased to exist because of 
mergers, takeovers, bankruptcies, or a decision not to prolong the collective agreement. 
The research sample consists of the 769 current collective labour agreements, ‘current’ meaning 
that the starting dates of these CLAs lie in or after 2001; more than half of them have starting dates 
in 2003. In figure 1, they are categorised by branch of industry, which, for convenience’s sake, shows 
only the aggregate level branches; in the analysis, more detailed branch categories are used. 
 











Source: DUCADAM dataset, selection of recent CLAs. 














Almost half of all CLAs are found in manufacturing, while less than one seventh of the employed la-
bour force is active in this branch of industry. This can partly be explained by the fact that, while a 
large firm is more likely to have a collective labour agreement than a smaller company, more large-
sized companies can be found in manufacturing than in any other branch of industry. A more impor-
tant reason is of a historic nature, however. In the early days of collective bargaining, the majority of 
the working population had a job in either manufacturing or farming; in other words, these branches 
of industry have a long history during which many collective labour agreements came into being. 
Usually, employers’ and employees’ representatives agree on sectoral CLAs first, after which mainly 
large companies begin formulating their own collective agreements. This is especially true for CLAs 
in manufacturing – to a large extent, farmers have never been organised, but factory workers have. 
Furthermore, manufacturing workers were proud of their craft. In order to protect their individual 
interests they tended to be organised in guilds and other associations, unlike employees in other 
branches. This put representatives of the guilds in a good position to bargain with the employer 
Other services
                                                  
7   The difference between 3752 and 1001 can be understood by realising that a CLA number is present in the database 
3,75 times on average, but the starting and expiration dates are different. For example, the CLA of Dutch Public Univer-
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over terms and conditions of employment. However, this last argument is not very strong, given the 
large time gap between the era of guilds and the early days of collective labour agreements. Al-
though the share of jobs in manufacturing decreased over time in relation to other branches, while 
workers’ representation developed and grew outside of manufacturing, the large number of CLAs in 
the manufacturing industry remained. 
In the next section, the work-family items in collective labour agreements are outlined and opera-
tionalised, after which the independent variables are described similarly. 
2.2   VARIABLES OF THE MODEL 
In the DUCADAM dataset, each collective labour agreement is coded for the presence or absence 
of regulations regarding part-time work, childcare, paternity leave, parental leave and pregnancy and 
maternity leave. These are the dependent variables of hypotheses 1 and 2. When an item is present, 
the variable is given the score of 1, and absence of the item results in a score of 0. The dependent 
compound variable in hypotheses 3 and 4 is called the ‘work-family balance score’ and is 
operationalised as the number of work-family balance provisions in CLAs. Scores can range from 0 
to 5, where 0 means that the CLA contains no work-family arrangements, and a score of 5 means 
that all items, (1) through (5), are present in the CLA. A more precise score for the extent of work-
family provisions in CLAs may be computed by also incorporating a number of specification variables 
(see section 3.3), but for now, only the incidence of the provisions is used to compute the score. 
                                                                                                                                                    
Before moving on to the description of the independent variables, some clarification on the Dutch 
system of categorising businesses may be useful. Each business, firm or company can be classified 
according to its core activity. The Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) defined a system called 
the Standard Business Index (SBI), which, at the highest level, consists of 17 branches of industry, 
labelled A to Q. Each branch is divided into one or more sub-branches of industry. There are 58 
sub-branches, numbered (discontinuously) from 01 to 99. This process of division continues until, at 
the most detailed level, a business is characterised by a five-digit code. A firm that is categorised un-
der code 6021.1 (Regulated public transport of persons by road) automatically falls under the cate-
gories 6021 (Regulated transport of persons by road), 602 (Transport by road), 60 (Transport over 
land) and I (Transport, storage and communication). 
The independent variable ‘female employment share’, in hypotheses 1 and 3, is operationalised as 
the number of women working within a sub-branch of industry8, divided by the total number of 
 
sities, which has CLA-number 1108, is present in the database four times – one that has been valid from 1-1-1999 till 
31-5-2000, one from 1-6-2000 till 31-5-2002, one from 1-6-2002 till 31-8-2003, and one from 31-8-2003 onwards. 
8   Ideally, since the level of analysis is the collective labour agreement, the female employment share should be measured 
at that level as well. In other words, the exact share of female employees should be known for each CLA. However, 
since these data are not available, aggregated data will be used. This means that each CLA is assigned the value for the 
share of female employees in the branch of industry in which the CLA belongs, and not the value for the share of female 
employees covered by the CLA itself. The female employment share is based on employees who work at least twelve 
hours per week, since the CBS considers working fewer hours non-substantial. 
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workers within the sub-branch. These data are obtained from the CBS. After assigning one of the 
sub-branch codes to each collective labour agreement, the female employment share that corre-
sponds to that sub-branch is attributed to the CLA. 
The gender of CLA negotiators, used in hypotheses 2 and 4, is measured at CLA level. A female ne-
gotiator is coded zero and a one represents a male negotiator. 
Because the dependent variable in hypotheses 1a through 1e is of the Yes/No type, these hypothe-
ses are tested using logistic regression, linking female employment shares to the presence of work-
family provisions in CLAs. Hypotheses 2a through 2e are also tested by means of logistic regression, 
relating gender to work-family arrangements in CLAs. Hypotheses 3 and 4 are tested with linear 
regression models, since the dependent compound variable ‘work-family provision score’ is meas-
ured at interval scale instead of nominal. 
Next, the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables will be specified by 
including four control variables. These variables are the yearly wage increase, CLA size, sector type, 
and CLA type. It is plausible that in CLAs where the employer and trade union have agreed on gen-
erous work-family arrangements, that this was accomplished at the cost of structural wage increas-
es9. This would imply lower annual wage increases in CLAs with a higher work-family balance score. 
In other words, wage increase has a moderating effect on the relationship. In the DUCADAM data-
set, up to eight variables are reserved for structural wage increase percentages, each accompanied 
by a date at which the increase takes place. For example, in the potato, vegetable and fruit wholesale 
CLA that is valid from 01-01-2003 to 30-06-2004, a structural wage increase takes place on three 
separate dates: 1 per cent on 01-01-2003, 1.5 per cent on 01-07-2003 and again 1.5 per cent on 01-
01-2004. The annual wage increase percentage can be computed by adding the percentages consecu-
tively10, and dividing this by the duration of the collective agreement. In this example, the annual 
wage increase percentage would be 4.05 per cent. 
Large companies and branches of industry tend to be especially innovative with regard to employee 
terms and conditions. This is called trend setting behaviour – after observing how large firms intro-
duce work-family provisions into their CLA, other, smaller companies may follow this example. Firm 
or branch size can thus be a control variable that partly obscures the relationship between the share 
of female employees and the presence of work-family items in CLAs. The data on CLA size, or the 
number of employees that a CLA refers to in the DUCADAM dataset come from both the FNV 
trade union and the Labour Inspectorate of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. They are 
available for 80 per cent of the CLAs in the sample. 
Although their effect cannot be accurately identified beforehand, the last two control variables are 
still deemed important in relation to this subject. The first is a dichotomous variable ‘sector’. Com-
                                                  
9   Structural wage increase as opposed to incidental wage increase. Wages increased structurally cannot be made undone 
by the employer; furthermore, this increase affects pension levels, whereas incidental wage increases do not. 
10   According to the formula (1 + p1/100) * (1 + p2/100) * (1 + p3/100) * ... – 1, where p is the percentage. 
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panies and branches of industry can be categorised into either the public or the private sector. Pub-
lic sector or governmental companies can be considered to play an exemplary role with respect to 
industrial relations, which might positively affect the presence of work-family provisions in public 
sector CLAs. On the other hand, competition in the private or market sector is fiercer, which may 
move employers to introduce or improve work-family provisions in their CLA in order to attract 
and retain employees. A similar rationale can be upheld for the second control variable, CLA type. 
As mentioned before, CLAs can be categorised into two types: company CLAs and sectoral CLAs. 
Competition on terms and conditions is stronger between firms that are bound by a company CLA 
than between those that are bound by a sectoral CLA – in the latter case, there is hardly any com-
petition, since all firms must adhere to the same sectoral CLA. This illustrates the importance of 
checking whether these variables have an effect on the relationship between the share of female 
employees and the presence of work-family items in CLAs. The correlation between these control 
variables and the independent variables of the model is sufficiently small to include them safely in the 
analysis11. 
                                                  
11   See appendix 2 for the correlation coefficients. 
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3   R ESULTS 
This part of the paper is introduced by a descriptive account of how and to what extent collective 
labour agreements in the Netherlands facilitate the combination of work and family. In other words, 
how are the dependent and independent variables of this paper distributed? After this, the main re-
sults of the paper are displayed, which will be followed by a section in which the dependent variable 
is scrutinised. 
3.1   THE WORK-FAMILY BALANCE IN DUTCH CLAS 
In 59 per cent of collective agreements, a provision for part-time work is included, while in 60 per 
cent of CLAs in the Netherlands childcare arrangements are included, as can be seen in the ‘Mean’ 
column in table 1. Paternity leave arrangements that are more generous in comparison to regula-
tions in the law12 are found in 20 per cent of Dutch CLAs, and parental leave is covered in almost 12 
per cent of the CLAs in the sample. Lastly, pregnancy and maternity leave exceeding legal regula-
tions are contained in only 8 per cent of the CLAs. In table 2, the work-family provision variables 
are detailed further. 
Table 1. Descriptives for the dependent and independent variables. N = 769. 
Variable  N  Min  Max  Mean  sd 
Dependent variables       
Part-time provisions  769  0  1  0.59  0.49 
Childcare provisions  769  0  1  0.60  0.49 
Paternity leave provisions  769  0  1  0.20  0.40 
Parental leave provisions  769  0  1  0.12  0.32 
Pregnancy and maternity leave provisions  768  0  1  0.08  0.27 
Work-family balance score  769  0  5  1.59  1.16 
Independent variables       
Female employment rate (%)  753  3.8  79.1  30.8  16.0 
Negotiator’s gender (0 or 1)  768  0  1  0.72  0.45 
Sources: CBS 2004 and DUCADAM dataset 2004.  
Combining the five provisions to arrive at the work-family balance score, it turns out that, on aver-
age, collective labour agreements include between one and two work-family provisions. In more 
than 20 per cent of CLAs, no work-family provisions can be found at all, while in less than 5 per 
cent more than three different provisions are included. 
                                                  
12   ‘Generous’ with respect to the employee: in other words, the employee is better off under the CLA than under the 
law. 
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There are large differences between branches of industry with respect to the share of female em-
ployees. Relatively few women (less than 10 per cent of all employees in the branch) are found 
working in the metal industry, construction, automobile and transport industry and shipping. Typical 
female branches are health, clothing industry, and other services (more than 75 per cent women). 
On average, 30.8 per cent of the labour force that is covered by a CLA is female, which is somewhat 
lower than the share of female employees in the labour force as a whole (41.8 per cent). Consider-
ing that 85 per cent of the labour force is covered by a CLA, this seems to indicate that of the re-
maining 15 per cent, a little over 100 per cent of the employees is female. However, the average of 
30.8 per cent is based on data measured at the sub-branch of industry level, not on an individual 
level. The main explanation for this relatively low percentage is the vast number of collective labour 
agreements in the manufacturing industry, where the share of female employees is low. 
In 72 per cent of the collective labour agreements, a male negotiator is responsible for the trade 
union side of the collective bargaining, which means that women bargained over the remaining 28 
per cent. In table 3, further details are provided about the negotiators. 
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Table 2. Number of collective labour agreements that contain work-family balance provisions, and number of em-
ployees, working 12 hours or more per week, who can make use of these provisions through the CLA. The data 
are categorised by branch of industry. N = 769. 
      Work-family balance provisions 
Branch of industry 
CLA 
cover-



















































































































































Agriculture and fishing  77%  11  5  4  1  2  0 
Minerals  18.1%  3  1 0 0 0 0 
Manufacturing  industry  76.3%  346  252  246 90 35 28 
Energy  23.3%  8  3 4 2 4 3 
Construction  73%  14  9  12 3 2 1 
Trading 68.6%  76  43  56  20  6  4 
Catering  24.6%  4  3 4 0 0 1 
Transportation  86.2%  125  43 33  5 10  9 
Financial  services  82.5%  27  13  16 4 6 3 
Business services  50.9%  60  35  37  13  6  3 
Public  administration  0.7%  8  4 4 0 2 0 
Education  65%  13  8 6 6 3 2 
Health  79.2%  20  11  13 4 4 1 
Other  services  41.8%  54  22 28  6 10  7 
Total  63.1%  769  452  463  154  90  62 
Employees affected (x 1000)    4743  3575  3687  985  1190  875 
Source: DUCADAM dataset. The number ‘4’ in the top row means that four of the eleven CLAs in the agriculture and fishing 
branch include childcare provisions. CLA coverage is the number of employees covered by a CLA in a particular branch of 
industry, in relation to all employees in that branch of industry. Note that the numbers in the bottom row, relating to em-
ployees affected, are in reality somewhat higher. They are computed using data in the DUCADAM dataset, which has miss-
ing values for 154 of the 769 cases. 
In table 2, frequencies for the five work-family provisions in CLAs are differentiated by branch of 
industry. In the minerals and transportation branch, the work-family conditions in CLAs are rela-
tively poor, especially on the subject of part-time and childcare provisions; whereas energy, catering 
and education are well above average where work-family provisions in the CLA are concerned. 
Whether this is indicative of anything is doubtful, however, since most of the above-mentioned 
branches accommodate relatively few CLAs.  
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Table 3. Male and female FNV negotiators per branch of industry. N = 322. 
Branch of industry  N Female  N Male  N Total  % Female  % Male 
Agriculture and fishing  0  7  7  0 %  100 % 
Minerals  0  2  2  0 %  100 % 
Manufacturing industry  21  65  86  24 %  76 % 
Energy  0  4  4  0 %  100 % 
Construction  1  9  10  10 %  90 % 
Trading  17  23  40  43 %  58 % 
Catering  1  2  3  33 %  67 % 
Transportation  9  36  45  20 %  80 % 
Financial services  4  16  20  20 %  80 % 
Business services  20  29  49  41 %  59 % 
Public administration  3  3  6  50 %  50 % 
Education  0  6  6  0 %  100 % 
Health  3  11  14  21 %  79 % 
Other services  14  16  30  47 %  53 % 
Total  93  229  322     
Source: DUCADAM dataset. N is the number of male and female negotiators per branch of industry. The percentage de-
notes the share of negotiators of the same sex within a branch. Note that the total numbers of negotiators (93, 229 and 
322) in this table are higher than the actual number of negotiating persons; this is due to the fact that over a third of the 
negotiators are active in more than one branch. 
There are 59 female and 158 male negotiators in the sample; they are responsible for 3.7 and 3.5 
CLAs on average, respectively. More female negotiators work in the manufacturing industry than in 
any other branch, which is understandable, because by far most of the collective labour agreements 
are negotiated in this branch of industry. This is illustrated in table 3. Compared to their male col-
leagues, they especially tend to work in the business services sector, the trading sector and the 
‘other services’ sector, whereas men are clearly over-represented in agriculture and fishing, miner-
als, energy, construction, and education13. 
3.2   THE ROLE OF GENDER IN THE WORK-FAMILY BALANCE IN DUTCH CLAS 
In this section, the outcomes of the hypotheses are described. Tables 4 and 5 show the results of 
hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively. Values in the table are Exp(B) values14, which means that a value of 
1 implies no effect between independent and dependent variable, a value smaller than 1 implies a 
negative effect and a value greater than 1 implies a positive effect. 
                                                  
13   It may be interesting to remark that there is hardly any correlation between the share of female employees and the 
share of female FNV negotiators within branches. The same is true for men. 
14   Exp(B) means e to the power of B, where e equals 2.71 and B is the coefficient of the independent variable. Suppose B 
has a value of 1.5. When the independent variable is increased with one unit, the likelihood of the dependent variable 
occurring (i.e. becoming 1 instead of 0) increases with 1.5. Or, in other words, it becomes e to the power of 1.5 (which 
equals 4.48) times as likely of the dependent variable occurring. 
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Table 4. Exp(B) coefficients, predicting the influence of the share of female employees on each of the five work-
family balance provisions. N = 769. 
  Part-






Share of female employees [0 – 
100%]  0.99 1.00  1.00  1.01 1.00 
Source: DUCADAM dataset. 
In table 4, all of the coefficients indicate the complete lack of a relationship between the share of 
female employees per CLA and each one of the work-family balance provisions in the CLA. Al-
though the coefficients in table 5 deviate a bit more from zero, these effects are still not significant, 
implying that the presence or absence of a specific work-family provision does not depend on the 
gender of the main FNV negotiator. Both hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 must therefore be refuted. 
Table 5. Exp(B) coefficients, predicting the influence of the gender of the main trade union negotiator on each of 
the five work-family balance provisions. N = 769. 
  Part-






Gender of negotiator [0, 1]  1.05  0.85  0.97  1.00  1.04 
Source: DUCADAM dataset. Female = 0, male = 1. 
Linear regression analysis on the third hypothesis, linking the share of female employees within a 
branch of industry to the extent to which CLAs include work-family provisions, shows no significant 
results either. The standardised beta coefficient is –0.07. Thus, if there is a relationship, it is not a 
clear one, and the null-hypothesis cannot yet be rejected. The lack of a clear relationship may be 
because there is a non-linear relationship. It is imaginable that employers cannot be moved to in-
clude work-family provisions in the CLA if the share of women in the company (or sector) is low, 
since that would mean a large investment that would only benefit a relatively small number of em-
ployees. If the share of female employees were high, however, employers might fear it would not be 
cost effective to provide all employees with work-family arrangements, and therefore they would, 
again, not include work-family items in the CLA. Only if the share of women were intermediate 
would employers be indulgent in the collective bargaining rounds in this respect. This implies a para-
bolic relationship between the share of female employees and the work-family balance score. How-
ever, trying to predict the work-family balance score with a squared female employee share yields 
no significant results (beta equals –0.011). Of course, employers’ arguments listed above are purely 
economic. A ‘social’ employer would reason quite differently, figuring that if the share of female em-
ployees in the company were high, it would be very important to have work-family provisions in the 
CLA since so many employees would appreciate that; and if it were low, including work-family pro-
visions would be a kind gesture to the few female employees at relatively low costs. From this ra-
tionale, it follows that the economic and social arguments produce contrary effects, which means 
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that effects will probably not be visible at the sector level. A more detailed focus on the employers 
themselves appears to be needed, including data on personnel and recruiting policies and on how 
employees are viewed (as assets or as liabilities). 
There is an even less clear association between the gender of the FNV trade union negotiator and 
the work-family balance score. The beta coefficient equals –0.011, which is not significant. Including 
both the share of female employees and the negotiator’s gender in one model causes both effects to 
become even smaller, as illustrated in model 1 in table 6. 
Table 6. Regression models predicting the work-family balance score [0 – 5] in collective labour agreements. N = 
769. 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Share of female employees within branch [0 – 100%]  – 0.006    0.005  – 0.034 
Negotiator's gender [0, 1] a – 0.007  – 0.001  – 0.009 
Structural wage increase per year [0 – 100%]       0.216 **     0.211** 
CLA size [0 – 320,000 employees]         0.028 
Private / public sector [1, 2] b        0.035 
Sectoral / company CLA [1, 2] c   –  0.089  * 
Standardised coefficients. ** Significant at α < 0.001; * Significant at α < 0.05. 
a Female = 0, male = 1. 
b Private sector = 1, public sector = 2. 
c Sectoral CLA = 1, company CLA = 2. 
To summarise, the share of women and the negotiator’s gender play no role in predicting the num-
ber of work-family provisions in the CLA, or if they do, the relationships between the variables are 
quite clouded and unclear.  
Surprisingly, there is a positive, significant relationship between the annual wage increase and the 
work-family balance score (see model 2 in the table). The correlation coefficient is 0.216 and is sig-
nificant at the 0.001 level. This gives rise to the idea that there might be a dichotomy between two 
groups of employers: those that provide their employees with both a generous salary increase and a 
good work-family balance, and those that do not (or less). This effect decreases a little when con-
trolling for sector (private or public) and type of CLA (sectoral or company CLA). As becomes clear 
from model 3 in table 6, neither sector nor type of CLA proves to have a significant effect on the 
work-family balance score. Possibly, employers only start thinking about including work-family provi-
sions in their CLA if there is financial room to do so, which is underscored by the wage increases 
employers are willing to give. This contrasts the idea of including these provisions as a strategic in-
vestment move to attract employees and only afterwards (possibly) increase profits. 
Apparently, some employers have room financially to provide (future) employees with both an 
above average wage increase and secondary work-family benefits, possibly because growth and 
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profit prospects are good, while other employers may find themselves under labour market pres-
sure and cannot be as generous to their employees. 
In Model 3, three more control variables are added: CLA size, sector and CLA type. Again, neither 
the effect of the share of female employees nor that of the gender of the negotiator becomes signifi-
cant. The effect of the wage increase drops a little but is still significant. No relationship can be 
found between the number of employees under the CLA and the work-family balance score, and 
neither is there a clear difference between private and public sector CLAs where the amount of 
work-family provisions in CLAs is concerned. The type of CLA does seem to matter, however. The 
empirical data illustrate that the number of work-family provisions in sectoral CLAs is greater than 
in company CLAs. A possible explanation for this is the following. CLA funds are formal financial 
reserves of companies and branches of industry, out of which specific expenses are paid. Examples 
of targets include childcare provisions, and paternity and parental leave provisions. The existence of 
a CLA fund paves the way for actually spending money on specific CLA provisions, whereas the ab-
sence of such a fund might enlarge the threshold to do so. It is more likely for sectoral CLAs than 
for company CLAs to make use of the concept of CLA funds, as is illustrated by the data: 18.1 per 
cent of the sectoral CLAs incorporates a CLA fund, whereas only 1.9 per cent of company CLAs 
uses this kind of funding. This implies a tendency for sectoral CLAs, as opposed to company CLAs, 
to have more extensive work-family balance provisions. 
3.3   LOOKING INTO THE WORK-FAMILY BALANCE SCORE 
When investigating the relationship between the share of female employees and the work-family 
balance score, it must be admitted that more detail could have been obtained by examining the five 
work-family items more closely. Merely analysing the incidence of a childcare provision in a collec-
tive labour agreement ignores the fact that some childcare provisions are far more costly to em-
ployers than others. For instance, an employer who grants every employee in need of childcare 100 
Euros a month to help pay for child day-care expenses is probably worse off financially than an em-
ployer who grants only female employees who have been in the company at least one year 50 Euros 
for childcare expenses, providing the child is under six years of age. 
Therefore, it may prove fruitful to rerun the analysis with a more precise dependent variable, to 
increase both its accuracy and variability. The simple work-family balance score that was used until 
now only considered whether a work-family sub-item was present in the CLA, neglecting the variety 
within the sub-items. In the DUCADAM dataset, the five work-family sub-items have up to 12 differ-
ent specification variables, which makes it possible to construct an extended work-family balance 
score based on 47 different variables, each of which has a specific weight. The details of this con-
struction are described in appendix 3. 
The performance of T-tests and Mann-Whitney tests on the group means of all specification vari-
ables, with the dichotomous variables share of female employees (high/low), negotiator’s gender, 
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CLA type and sector (public/private) as group identifiers, also gave support for rerunning the analy-
sis with an extended work-family balance score as the dependent variable. It turns out that there are 
numerous significant differences between the group means, often in favour of one of the two cate-
gories. In other words, taking the details of work-family provisions into account, instead of just the 
presence or absence of these provisions, may provide evidence that the work-family balance score 
can vary significantly depending on the share of female employees, the gender of the negotiator, the 
sector or the type of CLA. In appendix 4, the results of the difference tests are tabulated. 
The results of this analysis are shown in table 7. In all three models, the betas turn out to be quite 
similar to those in the previous table. 
Table 7. Regression models predicting the extended work-family balance score [0 – 100] in collective labour 
agreements. N = 769. 
  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6 
Share of female employees within branch [0 – 100%]  0.010  – 0.001  – 0.058 
Negotiator's gender 
a [0, 1]  – 0.002  0.003  – 0.008 
Structural wage increase per year [0 – 100%]    0.185 **  0.179 ** 
CLA size [0 – 320,000 employees]      0.055 
Private / public sector 
b [1, 2]      0.032 
Sectoral / company CLA 
c [1,  2]    –  0.150  ** 
Standardised coefficients. ** Significant at α < 0.001. 
a Female = 0, male = 1. 
b Private sector = 1, public sector = 2. 
c Sectoral CLA = 1, company CLA = 2. 
The main difference between the simple and the extended work-family balance models is the size of 
the two significant variables: in the extended version, the weight shifts a little in favour of the type of 
CLA. Basically, however, running the analysis with a more accurate dependent variable has not 
yielded any new results, which is underscored by the strength of the correlation between the simple 
and the extended work-family balance scores (r = 0.86). 
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4   C ONCLUSION 
No direct relationship exists between the share of female employees that are covered by a collec-
tive labour agreement and the extent to which CLAs include work-family provisions. This rate of 
inclusion cannot be explained by the gender of the negotiator either; whether male or female, a 
trade union negotiator is a trade union negotiator in this respect. 
Apparently, employers do not meet women’s demand for work-family balance provisions in collec-
tive labour agreements, in the sense that they do not supply (female) employees with an appropriate 
amount of work-family arrangements. Reasoning from the employee’s perspective, one might con-
clude that the extent to which employers include work-family provisions in their CLA is not a con-
vincingly strong argument for women to consider working for that company or in that sector, or 
perhaps to contemplate quitting their job. 
The absence of a relationship between the share of female employees and work-family provisions in 
the CLA may also mean something else. Even though the burden of combining work with childcare 
is taken up primarily by women, a trend towards both women and men taking up childcare respon-
sibilities is visible. This implies an increasing interest for employers to target not just women but all 
employees with respect to work-family provisions, which might explain the aforementioned absence 
of a clear relationship. 
When generalising to the sectoral level, no relationship exists between the type of sector (public or 
private) and work-family provisions in the CLA, neither at the level of individual provisions, nor at 
an aggregated and more detailed level, symbolised by the (extended) work-family balance score. The 
type of collective agreement, however, does matter. Employees who are covered by a sectoral CLA 
tend to have more extensive work-family provisions than employees covered by a company CLA, 
possibly because the concept of CLA funds is more common in sectoral CLAs. 
Demand does not play a role in the work-family benefits pattern in CLAs, but other reasons might 
exist. The relationship of an annual wage increase with the level of work-family provisions in CLAs 
may imply a caring—uncaring typology of companies, although stating this is simplifying matters 
vastly and demands new research.  
New lines of investigation may be conducted in the following direction. It can be hypothesised that 
companies, in their strive to attract and retain employees, show trend-following behaviour with re-
gard to other companies in the same branch of industry. If a competitor of company X introduces 
certain appealing terms and conditions in their CLA, company X may well fear losing valuable (fu-
ture) employees to this competitor. This could be a reason to include the same terms in company 
X’s own CLA. However, if one assumes only company size to be an indicator for the possibility of 
being a trendsetter, then this hypothesis must be refuted (see tables 5 and 6, CLA size). Another 
interesting line of reasoning, related to the central question in this paper, is the following. It can be 
argued that companies that include one type of work-family balance provision in their CLA do this 
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at the cost of another type. In other words, the work-family provisions are traded off against one 
another. This is based on the idea that companies try to keep employees satisfied at the lowest pos-
sible cost. The opposite of this idea is a clustering of work-family balance provisions: if one type is 
included in the CLA, it is likely that another type is as well. The idea behind this is that companies 
have ideologies with respect to their employees – either they care about their work-family balance, 
or they do not (but may have other priorities). 
26   AIAS – UvA    Work-family balance in collective agreements 
LITERATURE 
Beer, P. de (2002). ‘Arbeidsmarktbeleid slechts beperkt succesvol’. In: Zeggenschap 3, 2002, pp. 8-
11. 
Bruegel, I. (1999). 'Parenting, Employment and Social Exclusion', LEPU Seminar, Childcare for Social 
Inclusion, London, South Bank University, 14th April 1999. 
CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics) (2004). Voorburg/Heerlen. 
Department for Education and Employment (1998). Meeting the Childcare Challenge: A framework 
and consultation document. Department for Education and Employment /Ministers for 
Women. The Stationery Office, London. 
EIRO (2001). European Industrial Relations Observatory, Annual Review 2000. A review of devel-
opments in European industrial relations. EuroFound, Dublin, Ireland. 
Ermisch, J. (2003). An Economic Analysis of the Family. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
Ester, P. en H. Vinken (2000). Van later zorg: verwachtingen van Nederlanders over arbeid, zorg en 
vrije tijd in de 21e eeuw. OSA, Tilburg. 
Esveldt, I. (2002). Zorgen voor kinderen. Dilemma’s werkende ouders rond uitbesteding. In: Demos, 
jaargang 18, nummer 8. 
EuroFound (2004). Employment in household services. Main Findings from the National Reports. 
www.eurofound.eu.int; Living Conditions. 
http://www.eurofound.eu.int/emire (2004). Industrial Relations Knowledge Base. 
European Commission (2003). Employment in Europe 2003. Recent Trends and Prospects. Office 
for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg. 
Keuzenkamp, S and K. Oudhof (2000). Emancipatiemonitor 2000. SCP, The Hague; CBS, Voorburg. 
Leijnse, F (2001). Economie van de 21 eeuw: bloei door kennis en keuze: 'Het nieuwe werken'. Mi-
nisterie van Economische Zaken, 's-Gravenhage. 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2001). Herintredende Vrouwen, SZW Bijlage 1, 07/2004, 
The Hague. 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (2004). Verlofwijzer, http://verlofwijzer.szw.nl, The Hague. 
MuConsult (2000). Doelgroep-enquête 2000, Eindrapport. Interne uitgave, Amersfoort. 
OECD (2001). Balancing Work and Family Life: Helping Parents into Paid Employment. In: Employ-
ment Outlook 2001, Paris. 
Schaeps, M.J.M. (2003). Afspraken over kinderopvang in CAO’s. Een stand van zaken medio augustus 
2003. Arbeidsinspectie, Den Haag. 
Scharpf, F. W. (1997). Games real actors play. Actor-centred institutionalism in policy research. 
WestviewPress, Boulder / Colo / [etc.] 
Schreuder, K.P.A.B. en K.G. Tijdens (2003), Codeboek DUCADAM dataset. Een statistisch bestand 
van de FNV cao-databank, AIAS Working Paper WP03/24, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam. 
Schulten, T. (2000). New provisions on parental leave and childcare payments. Institute for Eco-
nomic and Social Research (WSI), Düsseldorf, Germany. 
Tijdens, K. G. (2002). ‘DUCADAM, the collective agreements database’. In: Steinmetz Archive 
Newsletter, March 2002. 
Tijdens, K.G., A. Dragstra, D. Dragstra, e.a. (2002). Loonwijzers 2001/2002. Werk, lonen en beroe-
pen van mannen en vrouwen in Nederland. AIAS Research Report RR02/10, Universiteit van 
Amsterdam, Amsterdam. 
Tijdens, K.G. and M. van Klaveren (2003). Is de combinatie van arbeid en zorg zwaar voor vrouwen 
met kinderen? Onderzoek op basis van de Loonwijzer. In: Zeggenschap, jrg. 14, nr. 1. 
AIAS – UvA   27 Kilian Schreuder 
Vossen, M. and M. Engelen (2002). Monitor Werkgeversbijdragen Kinderopvang. Research voor Be-
leid, Leiden. 
WRR (1991). Een werkend perspectief; arbeidsparticipatie in de jaren '90. Rapport van de WRR. 
SDU Uitgeverij, ‘s-Gravenhage. 
Yeandle, S., T. Gore, H. Pickford, B. Stiell (2000). Employment, Family and Community activities: A 
new balance for women and men. UK. CRESR, Sheffield Hallam University. 
http://www.eurofound.ie. 
28   AIAS – UvA    Work-family balance in collective agreements 
APPENDIX 1: DICTIONARY 
In this list, words and abbreviations that may have unclear or ambiguous meanings are explained. 
Branch  of  industry  The collection of companies with a similar core business. The 
CBS* distinguishes 58 different branches. 
CBS  Central Bureau of Statistics, situated in Voorburg and in Heerlen, 
the Netherlands. 
CLA  Collective Labour Agreement: a written agreement between em-
ployer and employees about terms and conditions. 
Company CLA  A CLA* by which one company (and thus all employees within 
the company) is covered. 
FNV  Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging, Federation of the Dutch 
Trade Unions: The largest trade union federation in the Nether-
lands. 
Gender  Being either male or female. 
Labour force  All (Dutch) employees and entrepreneurs who are actively work-
ing for at least twelve hours a week. 
Labour Inspectorate  Part of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, responsible 
for enforcing labour protection laws and investigating labour-
related complaints and accidents. 
Negotiator  Someone responsible for establishing a collective labour agree-
ment by means of collective bargaining. 
Sector, also Sector type  Either the public or the private sector. 
Sectoral CLA  A CLA* by which all companies (and thus all employees) with a 
similar core business are covered. 
Work-family balance provision, 
also Work-family provision 
Arrangements or conditions in a CLA* that make it easier for 
employees to combine work and family responsibilities. 
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APPENDIX  2: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT 
AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
In order for control variables to be safely used, the correlation between them should not exceed 
about 0.50. In the table below, correlation coefficients are given for all independent and all control 
variables. The largest is 0.37, which is still below 0.50. 

























































































































































Share of female employees within branch  1        
Negotiator's gender a –  0.10  1      
Structural wage increase per year  – 0.05  – 0.03  1       
CLA size  0.12 0.07  –  0.04  1     
Private / public sector b 0.37 0.07  –  0.04 0.11  1   
Sectoral / company CLA c – 0.26  – 0.01  – 0.02  – 0.27  – 0.16  1 
a Female = 0, male = 1. 
b Private sector = 1, public sector = 2. 
c Sectoral CLA = 1, company CLA = 2. 
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APPENDIX 3: CALCULATION OF THE EXTENDED WORK-FAMILY BAL-
ANCE SCORE 
The extended work-family balance score has a range of 0 to 100, where 100 stands for the best 
possible work-family provisions for the employee. Scores are attributed to sub-items according to 
their importance. In other words: how well do they assist female employees in combining work with 
family life? 
Since part-time and childcare provisions are structural rather than temporary, they can be given a 
maximum of 30 points, whereas parental leave and pregnancy/maternity leave arrangements receive 
up to 15 points. Paternity leave arrangements are the least demanding provisions financially – from 
the employer’s point of view – so this sub-item can maximally receive 10 points. 
In the tables below, an account is given of how the points are obtained. For each of the five work-
family sub-items applies that if there is no provision, no computation is necessary: the sub-item re-
ceives zero points. If a specific work-family provision does exist in the CLA, the final score for this 
sub-item can be computed according to the values in the table. For example, if there is no childcare 
provision in the CLA, the childcare variable as a whole receives zero points; if there is such a provi-
sion, the number of points depends on the exact contents of the provision. Some aspects of the 
childcare provision are more important than others, and will therefore potentially receive more 
points. 
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Table A1.1  Distribution of points for the part-time provision sub-item. 
Do employees have the right to work part-time? 
No  End-score for sub-item 'Part-time provisions' equals zero.    0   
Yes  Is this true for all employees?  No     + 0 
    Yes      +  5 
   No     +  3 
  
Must part-time employees work a 
minimum number of hours a week?  Yes No  +  1.5 
      
Is the minimum 
greater than 24?  Yes +  0 
   Number = 0     + 0 
   Number > 0     + 1 
   Percentage = 0      + 0 
  
Company policy to increase the 
number or percentage of part-time 
jobs: 
Percentage > 0     + 1 
   No     + 2 
  
Must part-time employees work a 
minimum number of hours a week to 
retain the right to schooling, training, 
early retirement, et cetera? 
Yes     + 0 
   No     + 0 
  
Do part-timers have the same rights 
as full-timers?  Yes     +  5 
   No     + 0 
  
Do part-timers receive the same 
overtime bonus as full-timers?  Yes     + 3 
   No     +  0 
  
Do part-timers have a voice in their 
working schedule?  Yes     + 5 
   No     + 0 
  
Do part-timers have the opportunity 
to save up for a leave of absence?  Yes     +  2 
   No     + 0 
  
Can part-timers increase their num-
ber of working hours?  Yes     + 3 
 
Table A1.2  Distribution of points for the childcare provision sub-item. 
Can employees make use of childcare provisions?   
No  End-score for sub-item 'Childcare provisions' equals zero.  0 
No     +  0 
Yes  Is this true for all employees? 
Yes     +  5 
  No     +  1  Only women can make use of 
childcare provisions.  Yes     +  0 
  ≤ 1 child      + 1 
 
Maximum number of children 
per employee.  > 1 child      + 3 
  ≤ € 5000      + 1 
 
Maximum amount of money 
available for childcare.  > € 5000      + 3 
  ≤ 4 years      + 1 
 
Maximum age of children for 
whom childcare is available.  > 4 years      + 3 
  No     +  0 
 
Is childcare being paid from a 
CLA fund?  Yes     +  6 
  No     +  4 
 Yes  ≤ € 2500  + 0 
 
Is the employer's financial con-
tribution for childcare maxi-
mised?   
How large is this maxi-
mum contribution?  > € 2500  + 2 
  No     +  0 
 
Are childcare arrangements set 
up according to the VWS table?  Yes     +  5 
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Table A1.3  Distribution of points for the paternity leave provision sub-item. 
Can employees make use of paternity leave provisions? 
 No  End-score for sub-item 'Paternity leave provisions' equals zero.  0 
 Yes  Is this provision set up according to the Work & Care Act?  No +  0 
   Yes  +  1 
  Number of days paternity leave.  ≤ 2  + 0 
    > 2  + 3 
  Number of hours paternity leave.  0  + 0 
    > 0  + 1 
  Continued pay during leave?  No  + 0 
   Yes  +  1 
  Continued pay during leave.  ≤ 50%  + 0 
   >50%  +  2 
  Is paternity leave being paid from a CLA fund?  No  + 0 
   Yes  +  2 
 
Table A1.4  Distribution of points for the parental leave provision sub-item. 
More days of parental leave than prescribed by law?    
 No  End-score for sub-item 'Parental leave provisions' equals zero.  0 
 Yes  ≤ 1 week  + 1 
 
Length of extra parental leave. 
> 1 week  + 2 
 No      +  0 
 Yes  ≤ 50%  + 2 
 
Continued pay during parental 
leave? 
 
Continued pay during parental 
leave.  > 50%  + 3 
 No      +  2 
 Yes  ≤ 20 hrs  + 1 
 
Obligation to continue working 
during parental leave? 
 
Obligation to continue working 
during parental leave.  > 20 hrs  + 0 
 No      +  0 
 
Is pension premium (employer) 
paid during parental leave?  Yes     +  1 
 No      +  0 
 
Is pension premium (employee) 
paid during parental leave?  Yes     +  1 
 No      +  0 
 
Is pension premium (fund) paid 
during parental leave?  Yes     +  1 
 No      +  0 
 
Is parental leave being paid from 
a CLA fund?  Yes     +  2 
  ≤ 4 years    + 0 
 
Parental leave: maximum allowed 
age of child.  > 4 years    + 1 
  ≤ 4 years    + 0 
 
Maximum allowed age of child in 
case of paid parental leave.  > 4 years    + 1 
 No      +  0 
 
Is partitioning of parental leave 
possible?  Yes     +  1 
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Table A1.5  Distribution of points for the pregnancy / maternity leave provision sub-item. 
More days of pregnancy / maternity leave than prescribed by law? 
 No  End-score for sub-item 'pregnancy / maternity leave provisions' equals zero.  0 
< 1 week  + 4   Yes 
 
Length of extra pregnancy / maternity leave.  > 1 week  + 8 
 No  +  0 
 
Does the employee have the right to refuse certain tasks? 
Yes +  2 
 No  +  0 
 
Can the employee make use of breast-feeding facilities? 
Yes +  2 
 No  +  3 
 
Can the pregnant employee be excluded from work? 
Yes +  0 
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APPENDIX  4: DIFFERENCE TESTS ON THE MEANS OF WORK-FAMILY 
VARIABLES 
In the table below, the means of all work-family balance variables are displayed per group, where 
groups are defined based on the share of female employees who are covered by a CLA, the negotia-
tor’s gender, public or private sector, and type of CLA. A number in bold formatting indicates a sig-
nificant difference; of the two values in that cell, the one in bold is the mean for the group in which 
the respective variable has the best work-family balance score. For instance, in the top left cell the 
mean values 0.62 and 0.51 are displayed. The CLAs in the sample are divided into two groups: those 
in which the share of female employees they cover is smaller than or equal to 41.8 per cent, and 
those in which it is greater15. In sixty-two per cent of the first group of CLAs, employees have the 
right to work part-time. This is significantly more than the fifty-one per cent of the second group. 
This is an indication of a negative relationship between the share of female employees and the ex-
tent to which CLAs include work-family provisions.  
Table A2.1  T-tests and Mann-Whitney tests on the means of all work-family balance variables. 
    Female share  Gender  Sector  CLA type 
Work-family balance variables  Test  0  1  0  1  1  2  1  2 
Do employees have the right to work part-time?  MW  0.62  0.51  0.58 0.59 0.59 0.51 0.70 0.64 
Is this true for all employees?  MW  0.31  0.36  0.27  0.34  0.31  0.49 0.41 0.33 
Must part-time employees work a minimum num-
ber of hours a week? 
MW  0.10  0.11  0.11 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.11 
If so, is the minimum greater than 24?  T  4.34  3.15  11.50  1.07  4.25  0.47  1.16  2.35 
Company policy to increase the number of part-
time jobs. 
T  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Company policy to increase the percentage of 
part-time jobs. 
T  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Must part-time employees work a minimum num-
ber of hours a week to retain the right to school-
ing, training, early retirement, et cetera? 
T 0.07  0.28 0.25  0.11  0.16  0.00  0.11 0.15 
Do part-timers have the same rights as full-timers?  MW  0.24  0.23  0.24  0.25  0.25  0.22  0.37  0.24 
Do part-timers receive the same overtime bonus 
as full-timers? 
MW  0.12  0.09  0.11 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.13 
Do part-timers have a voice in their working 
schedule? 
MW  0.07  0.07  0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.08 
Do part-timers have the opportunity to save up 
for a leave of absence? 
MW  0.07  0.10  0.05 0.09 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.09 
Can part-timers increase their number of working 
hours? 
MW  0.10  0.14  0.11 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.13 
Can employees make use of childcare provisions?  MW  0.61  0.62  0.63  0.59  0.60  0.61  0.73  0.67 
Is this true for all employees?  MW  0.35  0.30  0.38  0.31  0.33  0.29  0.43  0.37 
Only women can make use of childcare provisions.  MW  0.03  0.01  0.01 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.04 
Maximum number of children per employee.  T  1.40  5.32  0.78  2.91  2.50  0.00 4.85 1.70 
Maximum amount of money available for childcare.  T  5869  3391  6265  4727  5507  271 1851  7501 
Maximum age of children for whom childcare is 
available. 
T  2.36  2.40  2.44 2.30 2.38 1.82 3.04 2.47 
                                                  
15   41.8% is the average female employment rate in the Netherlands; in other words, of all employees, 41.8% is female. 
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    Female share  Gender  Sector  CLA type 
Work-family balance variables  Test  0  1  0  1  1  2  1  2 
Is childcare being paid from a CLA fund?  MW  0.04  0.10  0.05 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.20 0.02 
Is the employer's financial contribution for child-
care maximised? 
MW  0.17  0.18  0.13 0.18 0.17 0.10 0.25 0.18 
How large is this maximum contribution?  T  1374  5430  3756  1786  2508  0 4245  2388 
Are childcare arrangements set up according to 
the VWS table? 
MW  0.11  0.09  0.12 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.19  0.10 
Can employees make use of paternity leave provi-
sions? 
MW  0.20  0.21  0.20 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.23 
Is this provision set up according to the Work & 
Care Act? 
MW  0.21  0.16  0.19 0.19 0.20 0.08 0.24 0.23 
Number of days of paternity leave.  T  0.50  0.65  0.59  0.51  0.51  0.78  0.66  0.57 
Number of hours of paternity leave.  T  0.00  0.15  0.00  0.05  0.00  0.56  0.00 0.00 
Continued  pay  during  leave?  MW  0.19  0.19  0.21 0.19 0.20 0.16 0.22 0.22 
Continued  pay  during  leave.  T  16.86  17.93  18.70 16.77 16.73 15.69 20.83 18.41 
Is paternity leave being paid from a CLA fund?  MW  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.02  0.02  0.00 
More days of parental leave than prescribed by 
law? 
MW 0.10 0.15  0.12  0.12  0.11  0.25  0.12 0.12 
Length  of  extra  parental  leave.  T  0.39  0.65  0.38 0.47 0.42 0.82 0.32 0.54 
Continued pay during parental leave?  MW  0.04  0.10  0.05 0.06 0.04 0.22 0.11 0.03 
If so, level of pay during parental leave.  T  1.21  2.18  1.02  1.71  0.98  9.02 2.93 0.67 
Obligation to continue working during parental 
leave? 
MW  0.08  0.11  0.10 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.09 0.10 
If so, number of hours obliged to continue working 
during parental leave. 
T 0.63  0.45 0.68  0.57  0.63  0.16  0.73 0.73 
Is pension premium (employer) paid during paren-
tal leave? 
MW  0.07  0.06  0.04 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.07 
Is pension premium (employee) paid during paren-
tal leave? 
MW  0.37  0.22  0.31 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.31 0.41 
Is pension premium (fund) paid during parental 
leave? 
MW  0.01  0.02  0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 
Is parental leave being paid from a CLA fund?  MW  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Parental leave: maximum allowed age of child.  T  7.14  8.03  7.77 7.36 7.43 7.75  7.82 7.35 
Maximum allowed age of child in case of paid pa-
rental leave. 
T 0.01  0.13 0.02  0.04  0.02  0.31  0.03 0.04 
Is partitioning of parental leave possible?  MW  0.03  0.06  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04 
More days of pregnancy / maternity leave than 
prescribed by law? 
MW  0.08  0.09  0.08 0.08 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.09 
Length of extra pregnancy / maternity leave.  T  1.07  1.11  1.00  1.08  0.96  2.43  1.31 1.19 
Does the employee have the right to refuse certain 
tasks? 
MW 0.01 0.03  0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 
Can the employee make use of breast-feeding fa-
cilities? 
MW 0.01 0.04  0.01 0.02 0.01 0.08  0.02 0.02 
Can the pregnant employee be excluded from 
work? 
MW  0.01  0.02  0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 
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Test  T = Student’s T-test,  MW = Mann-Whitney (non-parametrical) test 
Female share  0 = less than or equal to 41.8%,  1 = more than 41.8% 
Gender  0 = female negotiator,  1 = male negotiator 
Sector  1 = private sector,  2 = public sector 
CLA type  1 = sectoral CLA ,  2 = company CLA 
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